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S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S
The robustness of reciprocity: Experimental evidence 
that each form of reciprocity is robust to the presence 
of other forms of reciprocity
David Melamed1*, Brent Simpson2*, Jered Abernathy2
Prosocial behavior is paradoxical because it often entails a cost to one’s own welfare to benefit others. Theoretical 
models suggest that prosociality is driven by several forms of reciprocity. Although we know a great deal about 
how each of these forms operates in isolation, they are rarely isolated in the real world. Rather, the topological 
features of human social networks are such that people are often confronted with multiple types of reciprocity 
simultaneously. Does our current understanding of human prosociality break down if we account for the fact that 
the various forms of reciprocity tend to co-occur in nature? Results of a large experiment show that each basis of 
human reciprocity is remarkably robust to the presence of other bases. This lends strong support to existing models 
of prosociality and puts theory and research on firmer ground in explaining the high levels of prosociality 
observed in human social networks.
INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behavior entails paying a cost for another agent to receive 
benefits. In such cases, prosociality undermines one’s own fitness or 
welfare. As a result, the ubiquity of prosocial behavior in humans 
has long been a puzzle for the social and biological sciences. The 
main solution to this puzzle is humans’ extensive embeddedness in 
social networks. In contrast to one-off interactions, relatively stable 
network structures promote prosociality (1–4) and alter evolutionary 
dynamics (5–6) via a range of mechanisms. Specifically, theoretical 
models and empirical tests show that we help those in our networks 
who have helped us (direct reciprocity; Fig. 1A) (7–9), pay forward 
help we have received from one person to another person in our 
network (generalized reciprocity; Fig. 1B) (10–12), give more in the 
presence of network members who can reward our giving (reputational 
giving; Fig. 1C) (13, 14), and relatedly, reward network members 
who have given to others (rewarding reputation; Fig. 1D) (15, 16).
While each of these forms of reciprocity is predicted to promote 
prosocial behavior, “surprising dynamics can arise when mechanisms 
are combined” (17). In nature, the mechanisms of reciprocity almost 
always overlap, since human social networks are characterized by 
basic properties, such as mutuality (9, 18, 19), clustering (20, 21), 
and short paths (21, 22), which provide the structural foundations 
for direct reciprocity, reputational giving, rewarding reputation, 
and generalized reciprocity (23). Furthermore, given the high levels 
of connectedness of human populations (24–26), any given person 
in a social network is generally embedded in multiple relation sets 
conducive to multiple bases and instances of reciprocity. In light of 
this complexity, we must understand how the embeddedness of 
multiple types of reciprocity affects prosocial behavior. While each 
of the forms of reciprocity predicts prosociality in isolation, it is 
possible—even likely—that some forms of reciprocity crowd out 
other forms. Only when we establish that the bases of reciprocity 
persist in the presence of other bases can we say with confidence 
whether theories and findings from controlled empirical tests apply 
in contexts where our social networks implicate multiple forms of 
prosociality at once.
A few studies have examined the presence of multiple forms of 
reciprocity. Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (27) examined di-
rect reciprocity and rewarding reputation. They found that while 
both forms of reciprocity had positive effects on prosociality, when 
both were present, the effect of reputations was diminished. In addition, 
when motives for reciprocity in the two forms conflicted—e.g., when 
participants interacted with an alter with whom they had a positive 
direct experience but who had a negative reputation—direct reciprocity 
was a stronger determinant of behavior toward the alter. Similarly, 
Simpson and colleagues (28), building on two earlier studies (29, 30), 
studied both generalized reciprocity and reputational giving. They 
found that generalized exchange is more likely to initiate chains of 
prosociality and that each form of reciprocity holds in the presence 
of the other. While this work sheds light on how prosociality is af-
fected by the presence of two forms of reciprocity, we do not know 
how each of the four bases of reciprocity identified above affect pro-
sociality in tandem nor do we know how multiple instances of 
generalized reciprocity, reputational giving, or rewarding reputa-
tion shape prosociality. For instance, receiving from multiple others 
in a generalized reciprocity structure may increase the extent to 
which one pays it forward, by shaping perceived norms about be-
havior within a given setting. Here, we address these questions 
using a large crowd-sourced experiment.
There are reasons to doubt whether any given basis of prosociality 
is robust to the presence of other bases. For instance, explicitly strategic 
forms of reciprocity (e.g., giving solely to gain a positive reputation 
and reap the benefits of indirect reciprocity) may “crowd out” gratitude 
and other more “sincere” prosocial bases of giving via generalized 
reciprocity. Similarly, given the more explicit norms governing 
direct reciprocity (9, 18), the presence of direct reciprocal relations 
may lead people to be less apt to engage in other bases of reciprocity 
(e.g., paying it forward or rewarding others for their giving, as seen 
by research by Molleman and colleagues outlined above). Last, the 
greater informational demands on reputational giving and rewarding 
reputation (31) may simply lead to a narrowing focus on more 
immediate, direct forms of reciprocity when both are present. For 
1Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA. 2Depart-
ment of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA.
*Corresponding author. Email: melamed.9@osu.edu (D.M.); bts@mailbox.sc.edu (B.S.)
Copyright © 2020 




for the Advancement 
of Science. No claim to 
original U.S. Government 
Works. Distributed 
under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 
NonCommercial 
License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).
 o
n







Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504     3 June 2020
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
2 of 7
instance, I may be less apt to indirectly reciprocate another’s gener-
osity toward a third party when focused on directly reciprocating 
help I have received. Similarly, rewarding reputation requires knowl-
edge of the broader structure of relations beyond just the agent and 
the person to whom they are giving, and such information is not 
always known or salient when deciding to offer help. More generally, 
a greater number of instances of reciprocity embedded within a par-
ticular relation may diminish the effects of some or even all of the 
forms of reciprocity.
Of course, the copresence of multiple bases of reciprocity could 
potentially have positive or buttressing effects. For instance, there is 
evidence that feelings of gratitude, or elevation, from one form 
reciprocity “spill over” to other types of relations, leading to higher 
overall levels of giving (32–34).
In short, we cannot know whether existing theoretical models and 
empirical results on prosociality apply to contexts where multiple bases 
of reciprocity and prosociality co-occur. Given that such contexts 
are ubiquitous in human social networks, we assessed the robustness 
of reciprocity with a large Web-based experiment in which participants 
interacted with ostensible others. This allowed us to carefully control 
both (i) the presence or absence of various types of relations and 
(ii) the behaviors of ostensible others in those relations. A controlled 
experiment is best suited to our research question since normative 
levels of giving may emerge in actual networks that would make 
it challenging to distinguish between various bases of reciprocity. 
This would be especially detrimental to our ability to draw casual 
inferences if the presence of any given basis of reciprocity affected 
giving in other bases. We therefore simulated others’ decisions to 
isolate the effects of our manipulated factors from each other and 
from variation in others’ giving behaviors. Further, it is difficult to 
use observational network data to infer the relational bases of pro-
sociality since prosocial behaviors may flow through triads, but 
without extended time stamps, it is impossible to isolate the mech-
anism responsible for giving (31).
In our experiment, helping was costly to the giver and socially 
beneficial, i.e., it benefited the target of help more than it cost the 
helper. Specifically, for all decisions, participants (and ostensible 
others in the experiment) decided how much of a 10-point endow-
ment to give to another. Any point given was multiplied by 2. Points 
had monetary values to participants.
We investigated direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity and both 
phases or “components” of indirect reciprocity, which we will label 
“reputational giving” (35) and “rewarding reputation” (15). For 
simplicity, we refer to direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity, 
reputational giving, and rewarding reputation as “four forms” of 
reciprocity, while recognizing that reputational giving and reward-
ing reputation, although conceptually distinct, are part of the same 
chain of giving (31). To isolate the effects of each of the four forms 
of reciprocity on prosociality while enabling them to be embedded 
with one another, we fully crossed the four forms with three levels 
or instantiations of each type, yielding a total of 81 conditions. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the experimental design. For each 
type of reciprocity, we included a control (the first level of each factor 
or form of reciprocity) where participants were given no informa-
tion about that type of reciprocity.
As shown in Table 1, the second level of the direct reciprocity 
manipulation entailed an ostensive other giving to the participant, 
and then the participant deciding how much, if any, to give back. 
The third level of this factor entailed the participant deciding how 
much to give to another participant, knowing that the participant 
would have the opportunity to reciprocate the participant’s giving.
The other factors (generalized reciprocity, reputational giving, 
and rewarding reputation) have a similar structure to one another, 
as Table 1 shows. The second level of each of these factors enables 
exactly one other individual to engage in the respective form of rec-
iprocity, while the third level of each of these factors enables two 
other individuals to engage in the respective form of reciprocity. 
For example, in the third level of reputational giving the participant 
(A) gives to another participant (B). Once A has given to B, C, and D 
each ostensibly decide how many points to give to A.
To illustrate, Fig. 2 shows a screenshot of the condition at the 
intersection of the second level of each factor. A participant in this 
condition would see (i) how many tokens H gave to the participant 
before the participant made his/her decision (direct reciprocity), 
(ii) how many tokens D gave the participant before the participant 
decided how many points to give to H (generalized reciprocity), (iii) that 
P would observe the participant’s giving and would have a chance to 
reward them (reputational giving), and (iv) how many tokens H gave 
to J before the participant decided how much to give H (rewarding 
reputation). To establish the robustness of our results across a wide 
range of alters’ behaviors, we simulated others’ giving based on random 
draws from a uniform distribution (see Materials and Methods). 
Thus, on the screen that followed the one depicted in Fig. 2, partic-
ipants were told how many tokens H gave to J, how many tokens H 
gave to the participant, and how many tokens D gave to the participant. 
On that same screen, the participant was asked how many tokens 
he/she wanted to give to H. The participant was also reminded that 
P would learn how many tokens the participant gave to H, and then, 
P would have an opportunity to give the participant tokens.
Each participant completed six randomly selected conditions. For 
each decision, they were given the information corresponding to the 
condition and asked how many (if any) out of a possible 10 tokens 
they wanted to give (see the Supplementary Materials). Participants 
were told they would be paid on the basis of the number of tokens 
they earned in one randomly selected round. Across all conditions, 




Beginning with direct reciprocity, when participants knew that an 
alter would have the opportunity to directly reward their giving, 
they gave more (coeff = 0.51, P < 0.001; table S2). This held across all 
A Direct reciprocity
Time 1 Time 2
A B B A
B Generalized reciprocity
Time 1 Time 2
C               A A B
C Reputational giving 
Time 1 Time 2
A B C               A
D Rewarding reputation
Time 1 Time 2
B               C A B
Fig. 1. Illustration of the four forms of reciprocity. Within each form, the per-
son’s behavior being explained is in bold font. Direct reciprocity explains both A 
and B’s behavior. A initially gives to B anticipating the norm of reciprocity. B gives 
back to A out of normative obligation.
 o
n







Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504     3 June 2020
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
3 of 7
conditions, meaning that the presence of other forms of reciprocity 
did not affect initiating direct reciprocity (other forms of reciproc-
ity were entered as categorical variables into the model; table S2, 
model 1). When an alter in a direct reciprocity relation gave to the 
participant, participant giving was contingent on how much they 
received. By design, the other’s giving was a randomly generated 
amount, and this amount affected the level of reciprocation (table 
S2, model 2). To illustrate, Fig. 3 plots the marginal means for the 
control condition, when the participant first decided how much to 
be given an alter who could directly reciprocate, and reciprocity 
amounts for each value that alter could give to the participant. When 
the alter gave the participant zero to four monetary units (MUs), 
the participant gave less than in the control condition. When the 
alter gave the participant five or more MUs, the participant gave 
more than in the control condition. Thus, we observe a “help enough 
or do not help at all” dynamic, with participants giving more when 
they had no reason to expect reciprocation from someone (i.e., in 
the control condition) than to others who had previously helped 
them but not very much. Tests of nested models show that none of 
the other forms of reciprocity moderates the effects of direct reci-
procity on giving, meaning that direct reciprocity promotes proso-
cial behavior regardless of whether it is embedded with other bases 
of reciprocity (see the Supplementary Materials).
Generalized reciprocity
Generalized reciprocity presents participants with information about 
how much one or two others (depending on condition) gave to them, 
before the participant has the opportunity to give to someone else. 
The amount each alter gave to the participant was random, as detailed 
above. Hence, we include this as a continuous variable predicting 
how much the participant gave to someone else. We control for the 
other forms of reciprocity as factors and find that the more others 
gave to the participant, the more the participant paid forward 
(coeff = 0.13, P < 0.001; table S3). These effects hold whether or not 
other forms of reciprocity were present (table S3, model 1), although 
the strength of the effect was moderated by the presence of reward-
ing reciprocity (table S3, model 2). Figure 4 illustrates that the effect 
of generalized reciprocity was strongest when rewarding reciprocity 
was not present (i.e., in the control condition). When the alter to 
whom the participant is giving gave to one or two others before the 
participant made his or her decision, the effect of generalized reciprocity 
was weaker but still positive. In terms of the presence of multiple 
others initiating generalized reciprocity (i.e., comparing levels 2 and 
3 of the generalized reciprocity manipulation), we find that what 
matters most is the total amount of tokens the participant received, 
not the number of others who gave those tokens (table S3, model 3). 
Moreover, we find that generalized reciprocity has a linear effect on 
giving—participants do not give less the more they receive (table S3, 
model 4). Thus, prosociality is robust to multiple initiators, provided 
they are giving sufficiently, and does not appear to be characterized 
by diminishing returns.
Reputational giving
For reputational giving, we focus on a mixed model with dummy 
variables for whether there was one or two others present to reward 
the participant’s giving. These effects are in contrast to the control 
condition, where there was no one present to reward giving. Other 
forms of reciprocity are controlled as factors. When either one or 
two others were present to indirectly reciprocate the participant’s 
giving, participants gave more (coeff = 0.41 and 0.52, both P < 0.001; 
table S4). It is worth pointing out that the effect of reputational giving 
Table 1. Summary of the experimental design. Within each type of reciprocity, there were three levels of the factor. This was crossed by the four types of 
reciprocity. Note: The participant took the perspective of A. If something occurred “first,” he or she was given the information before making his or her decision. 
Similarly, if something occurred “then,” he or she was told that someone else would see his or her choice. 
Direct reciprocity Generalized reciprocity Reputational giving (event 1 in indirect reciprocity)
Rewarding reciprocity 
(event 2 in indirect 
reciprocity)
Level 1
BA BA BA BA
Level 2
First AB C A BA B C
Then BA BA C A BA
Level 3
First BA D
C A BA B              C                D
Then AB BA D
C A BA
Fig. 2. Example screen of what participants saw. This screenshot illustrates the 
condition in which the participant goes second in direct reciprocity (H gives the 
participant before she decides how much to give H), there is one instance of gen-
eralized reciprocity (relation with D), there is one instance of reputational giving 
(relation with P), and there is one instance of rewarding reputations [H gives to 
someone else (J) before the participant decides how much to give H].
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diminishes when multiple others are present: When one other is present, 
participants give 0.41 points more, but when two others are present 
participants give 0.52 points more. Thus, being embedded in a structure 
with multiple instances of reputational giving appears to result in 
diminished returns for additional others. This tendency to engage 
in reputation seeking via prosociality was robust to whether other 
forms of reciprocity were present, although we found some variation 
in giving for different levels of direct reciprocity (table S4, model 2), 
as shown in Fig. 5. In particular, reputational giving has a stronger 
effect when direct reciprocity is absent, although it still promotes 
giving even in the presence of either form of direct reciprocity.
Rewarding reputation
Like generalized reciprocity, rewarding reputation presents partici-
pants with information about how much another gave before the 
participant decides whether and how much to give. Accordingly, we 
include how much the other (B) gave to one (C1) or two (C2) third 
parties before the participant (A) decides how much to give to B. 
We control for the other factors or forms of reciprocity. Here, we 
find that the more alter gave to third parties, the more the participant 
gave to alters (coeff = 0.18, P < 0.001; table S5). This result holds 
across all other forms of reciprocity, although we find that the effect 
of rewarding reciprocity varies somewhat with direct reciprocity 
Fig. 3. Marginal means from models 1 and 2 in table S2 of points given for direct reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the 
model. The control condition is the predicted or marginal value from model 1. The value for the first mover also comes from model 1. The other elements refer to how 
many points the other gave the participant before the participant decided how many to give. These estimates come from model 2.
Fig. 4. Marginal means from model 2 in table S3 of points given for generalized reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model. 
The x axis refers to how many points C gave to the participant before the participant decides how many points to give to B (Fig. 1B).
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(table S5, model 2). Figure 6 shows that if the alter to whom the 
participant is giving has already given to them by way of direct 
reciprocity, then it does not matter how much that alter gave to 
others—only direct reciprocity matters, which is largely consistent 
with the findings from Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (27) 
described earlier. This is the only instance where we find that one 
basis of reciprocity (direct reciprocity) reduces the tendency to engage 
in another type (rewarding reputation). Rewarding reputation has a 
positive effect in all other direct reciprocity conditions. As with gen-
eralized reciprocity, the alter could give to one or two others before 
the participant gives to alter. Also, as with the generalized reciprocity 
manipulation, we find that the number of others does not matter 
but how many points the alter gave does (table S5, model 3). Further, 
the effect of rewarding reputation is linear, with no evidence of 
diminishing returns for alter’s giving (table S5, model 4).
To summarize, with a single exception, all four forms of reciprocity 
positively predict giving, regardless of whether the other forms of 
reciprocity are present. That is, each form of reciprocity is robust to 
the presence of other forms. Specifically, the effects of direct reciprocity 
do not vary with other bases, and generalized reciprocity is strongest 
in the absence of rewarding reputation but is present across all con-
ditions. Both components of indirect reciprocity—reputational giving 
and rewarding reputations—are moderated by direct reciprocity 
(Figs. 5 and 6) only. However, as shown in Fig. 5, reputational giving 
Fig. 5. Marginal means from model 2 in table S4 of points given for reputational giving conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model. 
The x axis refers to which level of direct reciprocity the participant experienced.
Fig. 6. Marginal means from model 2 in table S5 of points given for rewarding reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model. 
The x axis refers to how many points B gave to C before the participant decides how many points to give to B (Fig. 1D).
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relations continually promote giving across all conditions. Reward-
ing reputation relations fail to increase giving in only one condition: 
when the alter to whom the participant is giving has given to the 
participant in a previous interaction. Furthermore, for both general-
ized reciprocity and rewarding reciprocity, we find that it is not the 
number of relations that matter but rather the amount of prosociality 
that flows through them.
DISCUSSION
We set out to answer a simple, but important, question: Are the con-
ditions of reciprocity robust to the fact that they co-occur in human 
social networks? That is, the structure of human social networks is 
such that the relational bases of different forms of reciprocity rarely, 
if ever, occur in isolation. At any given point, a person’s network may 
implicate them in deciding whether to (i) help a person who may 
(or may not) directly reciprocate that help in the future, (ii) directly 
reciprocate help from another network member, (iii) pay forward 
help received, (iv) give more to increase her reputation, and (v) help 
those that have helped others. Although our networks produce 
topologies that yield multiple bases of reciprocity, the bulk of past 
work treats them as occurring in isolation.
Here, we used a large Web-based experiment to isolate the bases 
of reciprocity to assess the extent to which the presence of one type 
attenuates prosociality effects in other types, as well as their condi-
tional impacts on prosocial behavior. Fortunately for both our the-
ories and human prosociality, our findings suggest that the forms of 
reciprocity are remarkably robust to the presence of other forms. 
That is, while we found some minor variation in how a given form 
of reciprocity might affect other forms, this variation was the excep-
tion, and robustness was the rule. This means that reciprocity, in its 
various forms, had a positive effect on participant giving under 
every condition we studied.
The robustness of reciprocity is, in many ways, remarkable. As 
noted earlier, there are clear reasons to expect the presence of one 
basis of reciprocity to alter generosity in other types of relations. But 
we did not find any strong detrimental moderating effects. This helps 
shed light on the remarkable quantity and diversity of prosociality 
observed in human populations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Institutional Review Board at the University of South Carolina 
reviewed and approved this research. The experiment was conducted 
using Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online crowd-sourcing platform 
that is used frequently for behavioral experiments in the social sciences 
(36–38). Turk workers read a brief description of the study, including 
a basic overview of the procedures and a summary of expected pay. 
If interested, they followed a link to an online survey that began with 
an online informed consent form. Those who completed the con-
sent form read detailed instructions and completed comprehension 
check (see the Supplementary Materials). Data were collected in the 
Spring of 2018.
Participants decided how many points to give in six different 
conditions. The conditions were randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution. When others made decisions before the participant 
decided how many points to give, the amounts others gave were 
randomly drawn from all possible amounts (0 to 10). It took participants 
approximately 10 min to complete the instructions and to make 
decisions. At the end of the study, they were paid and debriefed. 
Participants were told that they would be paid on the basis of a randomly 
selected trial. But given that others’ choices were simulated, all par-
ticipants were paid $2.00 at the conclusion of the experiment.
The data were modeled with linear mixed models, accounting for 
the nesting of conditions within participants (see the Supplementary 
Materials). More specifically, we estimated random intercept models 
that assume individual-level differences in giving, conditional on 
model parameters, are normally distributed. In the figures, we 
report marginal means drawn from the linear mixed models. SEs 
for the margins were computed using the delta method.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/23/eaba0504/DC1
View/request a protocol for this paper from Bio-protocol.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
 1. M. A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
 2. H. Ohtsuki, Y. Iwasa, The leading eight: Social norms that can maintain cooperation by 
indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 239, 435–444 (2006).
 3. D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, J. H. Fowler, N. A. Christakis, Static network structure can 
stabilize human cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 17093–17098 (2014).
 4. M. Nakamaru, H. Matsuda, Y. Iwasa, The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured 
population. J. Theor. Biol. 184, 65–81 (1997).
 5. M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita, T. Antal, Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations. 
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 365, 19–30 (2010).
 6. E. Lieberman, C. Hauert, M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature 433, 
312–316 (2005).
 7. R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).
 8. M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355, 250–253 
(1992).
 9. R. L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57 (1971).
 10. P. Bearman, Generalized exchange. Am. J. Sociol. 102, 1383–1415 (1997).
 11. T. Yamagishi, K. S. Cook, Generalized exchange and social dilemmas. Soc. Psychol. 
Quarterly 56, 235–248 (1993).
 12. T. Pfeiffer, C. Rutte, T. Killingback, M. Taborsky, S. Bonhoeffer, Evolution of cooperation by 
generalized reciprocity. Proc. Biol. Sci. 272, 1115–1120 (2005).
 13. M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 
573–577 (1998).
 14. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, H.-J. Krambeck, Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy 
of the commons’. Nature 415, 424–426 (2002).
 15. C. Wedekind, M. Milinski, Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science 288, 
850–852 (2000).
 16. A. Ule, A. Schram, A. Riedl, T. N. Cason, Indirect punishment and generosity toward 
strangers. Science 326, 1701–1704 (2009).
 17. D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Human cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 413–425 (2013).
 18. A. W. Gouldner, The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. Am. Sociol. Rev. 25, 
161–178 (1960).
 19. S. Wasserman, K. Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1994).
 20. M. Girvan, M. E. J. Newman, Community structure in social and biological networks. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 99, 7821–7826 (2002).
 21. D. J. Watts, S. H. Strogatz, Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks. Nature 393, 
440–442 (1998).
 22. S. Milgram, Small-world problem. Psychol. Today 1, 61–67 (1967).
 23. C. L. Apicella, F. W. Marlowe, J. H. Fowler, N. A. Christakis, Social networks 
and cooperation in hunter-gatherers. Nature 481, 497–501 (2012).
 24. L. Backstrom, J. Leskovec, in Supervised random walks: Predicting and recommending 
links in social networks. Proceedings of the Fourth ACM International Conference on Web 
Search and Data Mining (ACM, New York, 2011), pp. 635–644.
 25. A.-L. Barabási, Linked: The New Science of Networks (Basic Books, 2002).
 26. B. Cornwell, E. O. Laumann, L. P. Schumm, The social connectedness of older adults: 
A national profile. Am. Sociol. Rev. 73, 185–203 (2008).
 27. L. Molleman, E. van den Broek, M. Egas, Personal experience and reputation interact in 
human decisions to help reciprocally. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 280, 20123044 (2013).
 o
n







Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504     3 June 2020
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
7 of 7
 28. B. Simpson, A. Harrell, D. Melamed, N. Heiserman, D. V. Negraia, The roots of reciprocity: 
Gratitude and reputation in generalized exchange systems. Am. Soc. Rev. 83, 88–110 
(2018).
 29. W. E. Baker, N. Bulkley, Paying it forward vs. rewarding reputation: Mechanisms of 
generalized reciprocity. Org. Sci. 25, 1493–1510 (2014).
 30. R. Boyd,  P. J. Richerson, The evolution of indirect reciprocity. Soc. Networks 11, 213–236 
(1989).
 31. B. Simpson, A. Harrell, D. Melamed, N. Heiserman, D. V. Negraia, The roots of reciprocity: 
Gratitude and reputation in generalized exchange systems. Am. Sociol. Rev. 83, 88–110 
(2017).
 32. S. Schnall, J. Roper, D. M. Fessler, Elevation leads to altruistic behavior. Psychol. Sci. 21, 
315–320 (2010).
 33. J. A. Silvers, J. Haidt, Moral elevation can induce nursing. Emotion 8, 291–295 (2008).
 34. D. Freeman, K. Aquino, B. McFerran, Overcoming beneficiary race as an impediment 
to charitable donations: Social dominance orientation, the experience of moral elevation, 
and donation behavior. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 35, 72–84 (2009).
 35. M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437, 1291–1298 (2005).
 36. M. Buhrmester, T. Kwang, S. D. Gosling, Amazon’s mechanical turk: A new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 6, 3–5 (2011).
 37. J. Weinberg, J. Freese, D. McElhattan, Comparing data characteristics and results 
of an online factorial survey between a population-based and a crowdsource-recruited 
sample. Sociol. Sci. 1, 292–310 (2014).
 38. D. G. Rand, The promise of mechanical turk: How online labor markets can help theorists 
run behavioral experiments. J. Theor. Biol. 299, 172–179 (2012).
Acknowledgments 
Funding: The research reported here was funded in whole under awards SES-11626023 and 
SES-11626056 from the NSF and award W911NF1910281 from the U.S. Army Research Office/
Army Research Laboratory. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the NSF or Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory. Author contributions: 
D.M. and B.S. conceived the research. D.M., B.S., and J.A. designed the research. D.M. analyzed the 
data. D.M., B.S., and J.A. wrote the paper. Competing interests: The authors declare that they 
have no competing interests. Data and materials availability: All data needed to evaluate the 
conclusions in the paper are present in the paper and/or the Supplementary Materials. Additional 
data related to this paper are available at Harvard’s Dataverse under the title of the paper.
Submitted 30 October 2019
Accepted 24 March 2020
Published 3 June 2020
10.1126/sciadv.aba0504
Citation: D. Melamed, B. Simpson, J. Abernathy, The robustness of reciprocity: Experimental 
evidence that each form of reciprocity is robust to the presence of other forms of reciprocity. 
Sci. Adv. 6, eaba0504 (2020).
 o
n







to the presence of other forms of reciprocity
The robustness of reciprocity: Experimental evidence that each form of reciprocity is robust
David Melamed, Brent Simpson and Jered Abernathy
DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aba0504






This article cites 34 articles, 5 of which you can access for free
PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions
Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the 
 is a registered trademark of AAAS.Science AdvancesYork Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title 
(ISSN 2375-2548) is published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 NewScience Advances 
License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).
Science. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial 
Copyright © 2020 The Authors, some rights reserved; exclusive licensee American Association for the Advancement of
 o
n
 June 4, 2020
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
